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Abstract 
 
In this paper we provide a descriptive summary of a postal survey of FT 500 UK company audit 
committee chairman on the operations of UK audit committees. The survey represents an “insider 
view” of the activities of audit committees and the characteristics of non-executive directors and con-
tributes to the continuing debate on corporate governance reforms. In particular we report on com-
pany boards and their composition, audit committee chairman and their outside directorships, finan-
cial literacy and remuneration and various aspects of audit committee activity. Our survey shows that 
UK audit committees and corporate boards have undergone many changes in the last decade since the 
last comprehensive survey reported in Collier (1992). Our study on the current level of activity 
within major UK corporate audit committees deepens understanding of the roles and characteristics 
of non-executive directors and the operation of UK audit committees. In particular our survey shows 
that there is a significant shift in audit committee activities from the traditional financial reporting 
role to a greater focus on internal control and risk management. Independence is overwhelmingly 
seen as the most significant attribute of an audit committee member. Lack of time is perceived to be 
the greatest impediment to audit committee effectiveness but pressure from executives and an unclear 
remit are surprisingly prevalent problems even after ten years of corporate governance reforms. 
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Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades, non-executive directors 
(hereafter NED) have attracted a great deal of atten-
tion from different quarters of the academic commu-
nity and from corporate governance reformers. The 
current revival of interest is partly caused by the de-
mise of Enron and World.com, amongst others, and 
partly reflects the on-going public debates on the role 
of non-executive directors. In the UK, beginning 
with the Cadbury Report (1992), six regulatory and 
advisory reports have been published, the most re-
cent of which is the Smith Report (2003). A similar 
trend can be observed on the other side of the Atlan-
tic. In particular, the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) 
has re-emphasized non-executive directors’ monitor  
 
 
 
 
 
ing roles and put forward radical recommendations 
with reference to director independence, financial 
literacy and interlocking directorate.  
Despite these recent academic debates, our 
knowledge of how non-executive directors carry out 
their monitoring roles remains fragmentary. In this 
paper, we provide new evidence on director inde-
pendence, financial literary, monitoring activities, 
remuneration and document the views of audit com-
mittee chairman on these issues.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. Firstly, 
we present a brief review of the literature on director 
effectiveness with particular reference to audit com-
mittees. This  is  followed by  a short  section  which  
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 1, Issue 3, Spring 2004 
 
 
109
describes our survey design and responses. We then 
report our findings from a postal survey of FT 500 
audit committee chairmen, focusing on board inde-
pendence, director characteristics such as financial 
literacy, outside directorships, their monitoring activ-
ity and their remuneration. Some tentative conclu-
sions are drawn in the final section of the paper.  
 
Previous surveys on UK audit committees  
 
From the literature it is possible to identify three 
basic approaches to audit committee research which 
may be classified as perception-based approaches, 
activity-based approaches and benchmarking ap-
proaches.  
The perception-based approach asks relevant par-
ties to rank certain effectiveness indicators. Kalbers 
and Fogarty (1993) adopt this approach. They main-
tain that audit committee effectiveness is a function 
of its power in the broad sense. Kalbers and Fogarty 
(1993) decompose power into six dimensions: le-
gitimate, sanctionary, institutional support, expert, 
referent and diligence. They found that the organisa-
tional aspect of power is crucial for ensuring audit 
committee effectiveness. In particular, Kalbers and 
Fogarty (1993) argue that the audit committee needs 
a strong organisational mandate to be effective. This 
stronger mandate may be achieved by a well-
articulated charter and sufficient informal recogni-
tion by other internal organisations and agents, espe-
cially from directors. Financial literacy and diligence 
are also perceived to be important determinants of 
audit committee effectiveness.  
More broadly, Porter and Gendall (1998) elicit 
views of external and internal auditors, company and 
public sector chairmen and financial statement users. 
They found that each of these groups consider that 
the effectiveness of audit committees could be im-
proved by ensuring they have clearly defined written 
terms of reference; by routinely providing all rele-
vant parties with minutes of audit committee meet-
ings; and by disclosing the existence, membership 
and objectives of audit committees in corporate an-
nual reports.  
Activity-based approaches, as adopted by Menon 
and Williams (1994), Lee and Stone (1997), and Col-
lier and Gregory (1999), use meeting frequency to 
measure director monitoring activity. Menon and 
Williams (1994) show that audit committee meeting 
frequency may be affected by company size and 
board composition. Collier and Gregory (1999) ex-
tend this methodology and include audit committee 
meeting duration as an additional measure of its ac-
tivity. Collier and Gregory (1999) claim that domi-
nant chief executives may be associated with less 
audit committee activity and leverage is positively 
correlated with audit committee activity. They also 
report that the inclusion of inside directors reduces 
audit committee activity. Lee and Stone (1997) in-
troduce the issue of financial literacy and found that 
only a limited number of audit committee members 
have requisite qualifications. Lee and Stone (1997) 
document that more than half of US audit committee 
chairmen had previous experience as executive di-
rectors.  
The benchmark-based approach of Beasley 
(1996), Carello and Neal (2000) in the US and 
Peasnel et al (2000) and Song and Windram (2000) 
in the UK use established reporting standards as a 
yardstick and compare actual performance of 
financial reporting to the yardstick. These authors 
treat any failure to comply with these standards as an 
indicator of audit committee ineffectiveness. This 
approach is consistent with the organisational 
effectiveness model of Cameron (1986). Beasley 
(1996) investigates whether there is any link between 
financial reporting fraud and the existence of audit 
committees and finds that companies subject to SEC 
investigations differ from companies that have not 
been subject to the adverse rulings. Peasnell, et al 
(2000) and Song and Windram (2000) report similar 
results for UK companies that have been subject to 
adverse rulings by the Financial Reporting Review 
Panel (FRRP). All of these authors find that director 
independence increases audit committee 
effectiveness in financial reporting. In addition, Song 
and Windram (2000) also suggest that active audit 
committees and financially literate audit committees 
may reduce the likelihood of financial reporting 
malpractices. However, Song and Windram (2000) 
found no evidence to support the claim that director 
equity ownership may increase their effectiveness as 
monitors of financial reporting. Interestingly they 
indicate that non-executive directors with outside 
directorships may in fact increase audit committee 
effectiveness in financial reporting. This is consistent 
with a recent US study by Ferris, et al (2003). For a 
thorough review of the literature on audit committee 
effectiveness, we refer interested readers to DeZoort, 
et al (2003). To facilitate readers outside the UK, we 
should mention briefly previous surveys on UK audit 
committees. In their first surveys carried out in the 
1970s, Tricker (1978), and Chambers and Snook 
(1979) reported that very few UK companies had had 
an audit committee. This was consistent with the 
finding of the Accountants International Study 
Group (1977). Subsequent surveys by Marrian 
(1988) and Collier (1992) reveal that by the late 
1980s, about half top industrial firms in Times 1000 
had an audit committee. Collier (1995), Conyon and 
Mallin (1998) and Young (2000) report that over 80 
percent of large UK companies has an audit 
committee in late 1980s. The focus of our survey of 
2000-2001 is different from these earlier studies. 
Instead of documenting the institutionalisation of 
audit committees, we obtain “inside information” on 
boards of directors, audit committees, and important 
personal characteristics such as their financial 
literacy, outside directorships and remunerations. 
This additional information enables us to further 
investigate the effectiveness of non-executive 
directors in general and audit committees in 
particular.  
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Survey design 
Our survey focuses on the FT (Financial Times) 500 
companies, as at April 2000. A questionnaire was 
designed to ascertain information on the operation of 
UK audit committees and the roles of non-executive 
directors in their capacity as audit committee chair-
man. We focus specifically on audit committee 
chairman for a number of reasons. Firstly, these 
chairpersons are often designated as senior inde-
pendent directors. They comprise of a significant 
proportion of outside/non-executive directors across 
all FT 500 companies. These directors sit on the 
main board and therefore represent an important 
force at the board level, indeed many of them also 
serve as board Chairman, as we shall document later 
in this section.  
In addition, audit committee chairmen often 
serve on other board sub-committees, such as remu-
neration and nomination committees. Thus, although 
audit committee chairman is only one of a number of 
all non-executive directors, they clearly play a major 
role as non-executive directors. However, perhaps 
the most exciting aspect of seeking the views of au-
dit committee chairmen is their “insider knowledge” 
of the activities described above.  
The questionnaires were sent directly to audit 
committee chairmen of all FT500 companies at April 
2000. The survey comprised a number of questions 
of different styles and offered opportunities for fur-
ther comments where appropriate. After second re-
quests, 200 questionnaires were returned. This re-
sponse rate is quite satisfactory for this type of re-
search. The questionnaires were analysed and vari-
ous statistical test were carried out. The results were 
very interesting and further data is now being col-
lected on the companies in the sample. Many of the 
descriptive statistics were particularly striking and 
this paper reports on these results.  
 
Results 
 
Specifically, our analysis addresses the following 
aspects relating to non-executive directors and audit 
committees: features of the main board: its size, 
composition and meeting frequency; audit committee 
meetings: their frequency, duration and preparation 
time; time allocated in meetings between different 
functions of the audit committee; profile of audit 
committee chairmen: outside directorships, fees and 
financial literacy; links between director pay and 
personal characteristics; perceptions about the key 
attributes of NED’s and significant impediments to 
their effectiveness.  
 
Main board characteristics 
 
Statistics on the size and composition of the main 
board are displayed in Table 1. Preliminary analysis, 
not presented here, reveals that board size is closely 
correlated with firm size as measured by market 
capitalisation.  
Table 1. Main board features 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum StDev 
Size (number) 10 5 23 3.46 
Composition (%) 47 0 90 14.9 
Meetings (p.a.) 8.7 4 12 2.09 
 
It is noticeable that chairman and CEO duality is 
not an issue in our sample, as only 3.5% of the direc-
tors combine the roles of chief executive and board 
chairman. It is significant that on average non-
executive directors comprise about 50% of the main 
board. The majority of boards meet more than eight 
times during the year. Our survey suggests a non-
linear relationship between board composition and 
meeting frequency: when fewer non-executive direc-
tors sit on the board, board meeting frequency is 
high; as the number of non-executive directors in-
creases, the board meets less frequently; when the 
board is dominated by non-executive directors, meet-
ing frequency rises again. Smaller boards do not 
necessarily have more meetings. Yermack (1996) 
indicates that companies with smaller boards have 
higher market values than those with larger boards. 
This suggests that board meetings may be driven by 
other factors such as company performance.  
 
Audit committee meetings: frequency, duration 
and preparation time 
 
Four questions of the survey address audit committee 
meetings: annual meeting frequency, meeting dura-
tion, meeting preparation time and time spent at 
meetings on the audit committee’s three major roles. 
The results are reported in Tables 2 and 3. 
Table 2. Audit committee meetings 
 Mean Min. Max. StDev 
Meeting frequency (p.a.) 3.26 1 6 0.85 
Meeting duration (mins) 121 40 260 40.68 
Meeting preparation (mins) 294 180 960 149.0 
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About half of the audit committees meet three 
times a year, higher than that recommended by the 
Cadbury Committee (1992) and that reported in Col-
lier (1992), and in line with the recommendations of 
the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999).  
Meeting duration and time spent preparing for 
meetings exhibit more variation, however. The stan-
dard deviation of 149 for meeting preparation is par-
ticularly striking. 160 of the audit committees met on 
average between 1.5 and 2 hours. The majority of 
audit committee chairman spend three to five hours 
preparing for each audit committee meeting. We also 
found that audit committee chairmen with relevant 
accounting qualifications spent more time preparing 
for audit committee meetings.  
Table 3. Roles of audit committees 
Variable Mean Min. Max. StDev 
Financial reporting (time %) 46.05 7.69 87.95 0.1423 
Audit (time %) 11.55 0.00 46.15 0.0745 
Risk and control (time %) 42.40 10.95 80.00 0.1377 
 
As discussed above, apart from their traditional 
supervisory role in financial reporting, audit commit-
tees are also responsible for auditor appointments 
and fee determination, and internal control and risk 
management issues. Of these three major functions 
the audit committee spends the least time on issues 
relating to external auditors. Over 60% of our audit 
committees spent less than 10 minutes at their meet-
ings on the appointment, renewal and remuneration 
of external auditors. This raises questions about the 
sort of relationship which the audit committee has 
with the auditor, in particular, the issue of external 
auditor independence.  
Our audit committees spent only about 12% of 
their meeting time on audit appointment and fees 
issues. These statistics indicate that audit committees 
spend as much time on internal control and risk 
management issues as on financial reporting matters. 
Although there is no substantial evidence from pre-
vious research, it is fairly well accepted that audit 
committee activity has traditionally been dominated 
by its role of monitoring corporate financial report-
ing. Thus our survey reveals for the first time a sig-
nificant shift of UK audit committees, therefore pro-
viding empirical support for the Turnbull Report 
(1999) which focuses on risk management and inter-
nal control.  
 
Profile of AC chairmen 
 
This sub-section reports on outside directorships, 
director’s fees and financial literacy.  
 
 
 
Outside directorships 
 
Our survey results show that on average, audit com-
mittee chairmen hold between 3 and 4 outside direc-
torships. Further analysis reveals that one third of 
audit committee chairmen serve as executive direc-
tors of another company. It is noticeable that of these 
serving as executive directors, approximately half 
have accounting qualifications. Only 10 percent of 
audit committee chairman serve one board. 
Audit committee chairmen seem to fall into three 
groups. The first group consists of directors serving 
as NEDs for one company only; the second group of 
directors serve one company as an executive director 
as well as non-executives for more than one com-
pany. The last group serves solely as non-executive 
directors on a number of companies.  
Fees 
Information about fee paid to audit chairmen is pre-
sented in Tables 4 and 5. Several patterns emerge.  
First, the group of chairmen combining executive 
and non-executive roles generally receives the lowest 
fees for their NED roles. Second, average fees rise as 
outside directorships increase. Third, there does not 
seem to be a premium for financial literacy: as a 
group, directors with accounting qualifications do 
not earn more on average than those without. Audit 
committee chairmen with no executive role and with 
no formal accounting qualification receive the high-
est fees on average. Finally, there seems to be an 
inverse U-shaped relationship between remuneration 
and outside directorships. This non-linearity merits 
further investigations. 
Table 4. Fees, outside directorships and executive role 
Average Fee 
(£) Number of outside directorships 
If serve as 
executive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 Average
No 27105 24200 29444 31176 35500 30416 35714 31555 30167
Yes  31363 25000 25909 19285 36666 30000 25000 26393
Average 27105 26741 27285 29107 31296 31666 34444 29370 28968
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Table 5. Fees, financial literacy and executive role 
Average Fee (£)  Financial Literacy 
If serves as exec. No Yes Average 
No 31182 29434 30167  Yes 28225 24500 26393 
Average 30116 27907 28968 
 
Financial literacy 
The Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) recommended 
that every audit committee member should be finan-
cially literate or becomes so in a reasonable period of 
time after their appointment. The Committee also 
required that at least one audit committee member 
should have relevant financial qualifications and/or 
experience. Only half of our survey respondents had 
a formal accounting qualification. Of those audit 
committee chairmen with accounting qualifications, 
30 serve as executive directors of another company. 
On the other hand, of all those serving also as execu-
tive directors, about half had accounting qualifica-
tions.  
Overall, audit committee chairmen with qualifi-
cations are more active and spend more time on 
meeting preparation than those with no qualifications 
(see tables 6, 7 and 8). 
Table 6. Qualifications, outside directorships and executive role 
Sum of qualifications Number of outside directorships 
If as executive director 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 Total 
No 12 12 9 7 10 9 3 15 77 
Yes  5 6 4 5 3 2 5 30 
Total 12 17 15 11 15 12 5 20 107 
Table 7. Executive directorship, outside directorship and financial literacy 
If serving as execu-
tives Number of outside directorships 
Qualification 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 Total 
No 0 6 11 7 2 0 0 4 30 
Yes 0 5 6 4 5 3 2 5 30 
Total 0 11 17 11 7 3 2 9 60 
Table 8. Audit committee activity (in minutes) 
AC activity Qualifications 
Outside directorships No Yes Average 
0 777 814 800 
1 727 963 709 
2 643 744 686 
3 605 764 667 
4 611 780 705 
5 530 674 645 
6 622 782 711 
8 645 689 676 
Average 656 734 700 
 
Table 8 shows that activity measured as the total 
of annual meeting time and preparation time, is not 
constrained by other directorships: audit committee 
activity falls marginally as outside directorships in- 
 
 
crease. On the other hand, director fees appear to be 
highly correlated with audit committee activities. 
The table also clearly shows that directors with a 
financial qualification spend more time on their du-
ties as NED.  
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Table 9. Audit committee activity and director’s fees 
Director fee (£000) 
Activity 
8 9 15 20 25 35 40 50 60 Average 
(minutes) 900 570 637 450 697 743 1100 740 818 700 
 
The fact that some NEDs serve as executives of 
other companies is interesting. Booth and Deli 
(1996) suggests that CEO’s holding outside director-
ships serve as a kind of bonding. They claim that 
companies engage in bilateral trades in an in-kind 
market for directors. A separate analysis, not re-
ported in this paper, indicates that audit committee 
chairmen sitting on the main board of a large com-
pany are less likely to serve as executive directors 
for other companies. Directors with relevant qualifi-
cations and more active audit committees are less 
likely to hold executive directorships.  
 
Director Fees 
 
As NED remuneration is starting to attract more at-
tention, it is important that we report on this issue as 
well. Our results show that the average fee paid to 
NED serving as audit committee chairmen was 
£28,888 in 2000-2001. However, there is a great 
variation with a high of £60,000 and a low of £8,000. 
 
 
As indicated earlier in this section, financial 
qualification does not appear to be correlated with 
NED fees. Directors with a formal accounting quali-
fication and an executive directorship of another 
company earn the least. Directors without an ac-
counting qualification and with no executive direc-
torship earn the most. Given the descriptive nature of 
the present paper, we do not intend to report more 
results on NED pay. Given the limited scope of the 
present paper, we report detailed analysis of this im-
portant issue in another paper. 
 
Important audit committee characteristics and 
constraints 
 
As part of the survey, audit committee chairmen 
were asked to give their views on key factors 
affecting audit committee effectiveness. Firstly 
respondents were asked to identify the most 
important attribute of an audit committee member. 
The results are shown in table 10 below (148 audit 
committee chairmen responded definitively to this 
question). 
Table 10. Most important attribute of an audit committee member 
Relevant industry experience 6 4.0% 
Financial literacy 39 26.4% 
Time and commitment 13 8.8% 
Independence 90 60.8% 
Total 148 100% 
 
It is clear from the table that audit committee 
chairmen regard independence as the most important 
attribute of an audit committee member. This is con-
sistent with professional guidance, academic writing 
and agency theory in particular. More than a quarter 
of our respondents rank financial literacy as being 
most important (two-thirds of these directors have 
accounting qualifications). However, of all AC 
chairmen with accounting qualifications, only a 
quarter considered financial literacy to be most im-
portant. On the other hand, 41% of the directors with 
qualifications rank independence as being most im-
portant.  
Audit committee chairmen were also asked to 
identify the greatest impediment to audit committee 
effectiveness. The results are shown in table 11 be-
low. The group of audit committee chairmen who 
also serve as executive directors with another com-
pany are likely to face acute time constraints. More 
than one third of the 131 audit committee chairman, 
who expressed a definitive view on the major im-
pediment to audit committee effectiveness, regarded 
the lack of time as being the most important factor. 
Although this is a concern it is perhaps not surpris-
ing. Of much more significance is the fact that just 
over one-third claims that pressure from the execu-
tives is the greatest impediment and 22% rated an 
unclear remit to be the most significant hindrance. 
Pressure from executive directors is a direct chal-
lenge to non-executive director independence and the 
strength of feeling shown by our results illustrates a 
serious potential threat to audit committee integrity 
from aggressive executive directors. The overwhelm-
ing importance given to independence as the most 
significant attribute of an audit committee further 
demonstrates this problem. It would appear that de-
spite corporate governance reforms significant pres-
sure continues to be applied to non-executive direc-
tors in the boardroom. It is also disturbing to note 
that more than one fifth of audit committee chairmen 
state that an unclear remit is the greatest impediment 
to audit committee effectiveness. Given the almost 
universal existence of audit committees in the UK 
and multiple professional guidance pronouncements 
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in this area, one would have thought that the audit committee remit was now widely established.  
Table 11. Most significant impediment to audit committee effectiveness 
Pressure from executives 38 29.0% 
Lack of time 45 34.4% 
Poor remuneration 1 0.8% 
Lack of training 18 13.7% 
Unclear remit 29 22.1% 
Total 131 100% 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we present a descriptive analysis of the 
latest survey of UK audit committee chairmen with 
particular reference to the characteristics of audit 
committees and characteristics of non-executive di-
rectors such as the operations of the main board and 
audit committees, director financial literacy, outside 
directorships and remuneration.  
This research reveals that corporate boards of the 
largest UK companies now comprise approximately 
equal numbers of executive and non-executive direc-
tors. Audit committee meeting frequency has in-
creased over the last twenty years but meeting dura-
tion and preparation time exhibit large variations. 
The audit committee meeting agenda has experi-
enced a considerable shift towards internal control 
and risk management activities and less time is spent 
than in the past on the traditional financial reporting 
role.  
A large proportion of audit committee chairmen 
hold outside directorships, only 10 percent of our 
respondents serve one company only. More than half 
of the audit committee chairman in our sample has 
accounting qualifications. Compared to their peers, 
those with accounting qualifications earn less if they 
also serve as executives of another company. The 
market seems to reward dedication and loyalty rather 
than qualification. NED remuneration would appear 
to be related to board and audit committee meeting 
activities. Audit committee chairman with account-
ing qualifications spend more time preparing for 
meetings. It appears that board size, financial literacy 
and audit committee meeting frequency may reduce 
the probability of holding executive directorship. 
Those non-executive directors with financial qualifi-
cations are more likely to hold multiple director-
ships.  
In light of recent world-wide corporate govern-
ance reform pronouncements, it is interesting to note 
that a vast majority of audit committee chairmen 
rank independence as the most important attributes 
of a NED with a significant minority giving prece-
dence to financial literacy. The views of audit com-
mittee chairmen regarding the most significant im-
pediment to audit committee effectiveness were per-
haps the most striking findings. Over one-third of 
chairmen ranked time constraints as the greatest im-
pediment to audit committee effectiveness but almost 
30% stated pressure from executives was most sig-
nificant and 22% believed an unclear remit was their 
greatest impediment.  
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